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1 Introduction
There has recently been debate in the literature over whether the metaphysical doc-
trine popularly known as Humean supervenience can be reconciled—in whole or in
part—with certain empirical facts about quantum entanglement. In this paper, I un-
dertake a critical analysis ofHumean eorts to eect such a reconciliation. I beginwith
a discussion of the relationship between Humeanism and quantummechanics; I sug-
gest that there are some diculties even when considering single-particle quantum
mechanics, but agree that the real problems come when considering many-particle
quantum mechanics. I then review the available strategies for overcoming this prob-
lem, and nd them wanting.
2 Single-particle quantum mechanics
Let’s begin by reviewing the general quantum formalism. At least at the level of text-
book formalism, any quantum system is represented by a Hilbert space H: a (possibly
innite-dimensional) complex vector space. A point (a vector, or ket) |ψ〉 in H repre-
sents possible instantaneous states of the system. Taking time to be represented by a
one-dimensional space T ∼= R, a history of such a system is represented by a function
|ψ(t)〉 : T → H, associating to each time the state of the system at that time.
The facts about what particular kind of systemwe have are coded up in the structure
of the system’s observables: a collection of self-adjoint operators on the Hilbert space,
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H. A given observable Oˆ is canonically associated with a collection {|χi〉}i∈I (where I
is some index set) of eigenkets: points inH on which Oˆ acts as
Oˆ |i〉 = oi |χi〉 (1)
where oi is referred to as the eigenvalue of |χi〉 (with respect to Oˆ). Each observable is as-
sociated to a certain measurable quantity: if the quantity associated to Oˆ is measured,
then each eigenvalue oi is a possible value for the result to take. If this measurement is
performed on a system in state |ψ〉, then the probability of obtaining oi as the outcome
of the measurement is
| 〈χi|ψ〉 |2 (2)
(Note that in particular, the probability of obtaining outcome oi uponmeasuring Oˆ on
|χi〉 is 1.)
The most important such observable is probably the Hamiltonian, Hˆ , whose asso-
ciated measurable quantity is that of the total energy. The reason for its importance
lies in its connection to the dynamics: a history |ψ(t)〉 of the system is dynamically
allowed i it satises Schrödinger’s equation,
i~
d |ψ(t)〉
dt
= Hˆ |ψ(t)〉 (3)
Thus, the Hamiltonian of a system is what determines its evolution over time.
The other useful thing about observables is that the spectrum of eigenkets {|χi〉}i∈I
often forms a basis of Hilbert space: a linearly independent set of vectors which col-
lectively span the space. This means that we can represent |ψ〉 by an indexed set of
complex numbers {ψi}i∈I , with the relationship to |ψ〉 being given by
|ψ〉 =
∑
i∈I
ψi |χi〉 (4)
An indexed set of numbers {ψi}i∈I is essentially the same thing as a functionψ(i) : I →
C, by the correspondence ψ(i) = ψi. Finally, since each point ofH can be represented
by such a function, then if we have a function |ψ(t)〉 : T → H, we can represent that
by a function ψ(t, i) : T × I → C.
Let us turn to the particular case of a single (spinless) particle. This particle’s Hilbert
space carries a position operator Xˆ : that is, an operator whose associated measurable
quantity is the particle’s position in space. Let {|δi〉}i∈I be the eigenkets of Xˆ ; the
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possible eigenvalues form a space X ∼= R3. Now it turns out that in this case, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between I and X ; that is, there is at most one eigenket
with a given eigenvalue x ∈ X . For this reason, we standardly useX itself as the index
set, writing the eigenkets as {|δx〉}x∈X . All the information about the vector |ψ〉 can
therefore be represented using a function ψ(x) : X → C, with the property
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈X
ψ(x) |δx〉 (5)
We can then represent a trajectory |ψ(t)〉 throughH by a function ψ(t, x) : T ×X → C.
This function is generally known as the wavefunction of the particle.
Thus speaketh the quantum textbooks. However, the question of whether the above
is adequate as a “description of a single particle” is rather philosophically vexed. Plau-
sibly, knowing the above is enough to engage in experiments with such a particle; but
if we are to read o metaphysical lessons from a description, then we want to be con-
dent that that description goes beyondmere instrumentalist instructions. In particu-
lar, the description abovewas ratherweaselly on the connection between the dynamics
and experiment: in what sense are measurable quantities “associated to” observables,
andwhy domeasurements of such quantities yield outcomes with probabilities given
by (2)?
Fully answering such questions would require that we confront the notorious mea-
surement problem of quantum mechanics.1 But it is not only controversial how one
ought best to solve the measurement problem; it is even controversial what solving it
requires. On primitive-ontology approaches,2 the textbook formalism requires supple-
mentation. We must specify an ontology for quantum mechanics in terms of which
experimental outcomes can be couched; solving the measurement problem is a mat-
ter of demonstrating that quantum theory will predict that the primitive ontology be
arranged in amanner thatmatches our observations. On other approaches to themea-
surement problem, the challenge is how to “read o” an ontology from the textbook
1It is somewhat contested how best to think of the measurement problem. [Albert, 1994] charac-
terises the problem as being how to reconcile the application of the collapse postulate in measure-
ment contexts with the application of the standard unitary dynamics in non-measurement contexts;
[Wallace, 2012a] characterises it as the fact that standard application of quantum mechanics does
not seem to consistently think of the state space of quantum mechanics as representing either a
space of physical states, nor as representing a space of probability distributions—but, rather, shift-
ing between the two as we move from “microscopic” to “macroscopic” contexts.
2[Goldstein, 1998]; [Maudlin, 2007c]; [Allori et al., 2008]
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dynamics (Everett),3 or perhaps some supplemented dynamics (bare GRW):4 that is,
rather than taking an ontology as understood and showing how it meshes with the
dynamics, we seek to extract an understanding of the dynamics in ontological terms,
and show how that ontology comes to be arranged in a manner consonant with our
observations.
Clearly, such issues are unlikely to be settled anytime soon. Nor, however, can we
simply ignore them for the purposes of this paper: as just discussed, the position
one takes on these issues bears on how one should go about answering questions
about quantum mechanics’ metaphysical structure (such as whether it is consistent
withHumean supervenience). So instead, I simply stipulate that I will supposewe are
considering a primitive-ontology solution to themeasurement problem: more speci-
cally, that we have signed up to Bohmianmechanics.5 The reason I do so is not because
Bohmianmechanics is my preferred solution to the measurement problem (it’s not, as
it happens). Rather, I do so because several of the proposals for reconciling quantum
mechanics withHumean superveniencemake use of some form of primitive-ontology
framework; and Bohmian mechanics is not only one of the best-developed versions of
such a framework, it is also one which (as we shall see) looks to be the most hospitable
to the advocate of Humean supervenience. In other words, given that my aim in this
essay is to argue against the compatibility of quantum mechanics with Humean su-
pervenience, it seems that going with a Bohmian framework is the most dialectically
generous way to proceed. As a result, this essay will be mostly about the metaphysics
of entanglement in Bohmian mechanics, rather than in general—although at various
points, I’ll contrast the Bohmian picture with alternatives.
So: what is this framework? The postulated primitive ontology, for Bohmians, con-
sists of pointlike entities; I’ll refer to the entities themselves as “corpuscles”, reserv-
ing “particle” to refer to a combined corpuscle-plus-wavefunction system. (This is
just meant as terminological stipulation—in particular, no lessons about the reality
or metaphysical nature of the wavefunction ought to be inferred.) The crucial thing
about such corpuscles is that at all moments of time, they have quite denite positions
and velocities. So for a single (spinless) particle, we supplement the formalism above
with an extra X-valued variable Q, representing the position of the corpuscle. A his-
tory of the corpuscle is represented by a functionQ(t) : T → X . Dynamically allowed
3[Wallace, 2012b]; [Saunders et al., 2010]
4[Ghirardi et al., 1986]
5For an introduction to Bohmian mechanics (especially the form of it appealed to here), see
[Dürr et al., 1992].
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histories of the corpuscle are those which satisfy the guidance equation
dQ
dt
=
~
m
Im
(∇ψ
ψ
(Q)
)
(6)
where m is the mass of the particle and ψ is the wavefunction (as dened by (5)).
The guidance equation (6), together with the Schrödinger equation (3), constitute the
Bohmian dynamics.6
3 Humean supervenience
How does all this square with the picture of the world advanced by Humean super-
venience? That picture is described by David Lewis as follows:
Humean Supervenience [. . . ] says that in a world like ours, the fundamen-
tal relations are exactly the spatiotemporal relations: distance relations,
both spacelike and timelike, and perhaps also occupancy relations between
point-sized things and spacetime points. And it says that in a world like
ours, the fundamental properties are local qualities: perfectly natural in-
trinsic properties of points, or of point-sized occupants of points. Therefore
it says that all else supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local
qualities throughout all of history, past and present and future.7
So prima facie, at least, if we want to show that a Bohmian particle is in accor-
dance with Humean supervenience, we need to show that the above formal apparatus
can be understood as describing a distribution of perfectly natural instrinsic prop-
erties over spacetime points, or over the point-sized occupants of spacetime points.
[Maudlin, 2007b] calls this the doctrine of Separability: the claim that “the complete
physical state of the world is determined by (supervenes on) the intrinsic physical
state of each spacetime point (or each pointlike object) and the spatio-temporal rela-
tions between those points.”8 One option is to take this talk of the “quantum state”
seriously, as the state of the Bohmian corpuscle—i.e., as representing a certain kind
6This is all working in the case where we are dealing with a single particle in isolation. The manner in
which Bohmian dynamics for a single particle “emerge” from the Bohmian dynamics for an aggre-
gate of particles—more generally, the manner in which Bohmian dynamics for a subsystem emerge
from the dynamics for the subsystem together with its environment—is a topic we shall get to later
in this essay.
7[Lewis, 1994, p. 474]
8[Maudlin, 2007b, p. 51]
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of property for that corpuscle. This suggests interpreting the points of H as being
the determinates of a determinable property, with the corpuscle as the bearer of this
property. This looks pretty good: the corpuscles are indeed “point-sized occupants of
spacetime points”; so this construal of things looks to be Humeanistically hygienic.9
It is worth noting the work that the commitment to Bohmianism is doing here. Had
we not decided to go with Bohmianism, then this way of being a quantum Humean
would be rather more strained; attaining Separability by interpreting the quantum
state as the state of something will only be possible for those who have an appro-
priately point-like something with which to carry this out. Note that this even rules
out other forms of primitive ontology, such as GRWm or GRWf. If the particle is as-
sociated, at each time, with a mass density or a distribution of ashes (rather than a
Bohmian corpuscle), then it is not a point-sized occupant of one spatial point at a time:
it is either a region-sized occupant, or else a point-sized occupant of multiple spatial
points at each time (and in the case of ashes, sometimes an occupant of no point). If
there is no primitive ontology specied, on the other hand, then the only thing around
to be the bearer of the quantum state is the quantumparticle itself (conceived of thinly,
as whatever it is that bears the quantum state). Presumably, the occupancy-facts for
such a thing are just given by the position-basis representation of its quantum state.
After all, each position eigenket admits of a natural interpretation as representing a
state of denite occupancy: a state, that is, in which the particle bears the occupation
relation to exactly one spacetime point. A superposition of such eigenkets may there-
fore be interpreted as representing a state in which the particle bears the occupancy
relation to multiple spacetime points; and, moreover, one in which the occupancy
relation is a determinable relation, whose determinates have the structure of the com-
plex numbers.10 (This seems more appropriate than describing it as one in which the
particle occupies dierent spacetime points to “dierent degrees”: that would seem
to be apt only if the determinates had the structure of the positive real numbers.) So
again, the picture obtained seems distinctly unHumean, involving an object which is
multiply (and complexly, in both senses) located.
9There are some subtleties about whether the properties of a Bohmian corpuscle really can be thought
of as localised to whatever point the corpuscle occupies [Brown et al., 1996]; in the interests of char-
ity, I put these concerns to one side.
10Actually, things will be a bit more complicated than that, since some of the structure of the complex
numbers is surplus (as a result of the phase-equivalence of kets). So the real structure they exhibit
will be like that of the complex numbers, but without data concerning absolute (as opposed to
relative) phase.
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Nevertheless: if one is happywith Bohmianism, then interpreting the quantum state
as representing a (perfectly natural and intrinsic) property of the corpuscle is one way
of making single-particle quantum mechanics consistent with Separability. The other
option is to interpret the wavefunction ψ(t, x) as describing (perfectly natural and in-
trinsic) properties of spacetime points. Indeed, this is arguably the received view on
how Humeans should understand the quantum mechanics of particles, as expressed
in the following forceful statement of this position:
The sorts of physical objects that wave functions are, on this way of think-
ing, are (plainly) elds—which is to say that they are the sorts of objects
whose states one species by specifying the values of some set of numbers
at every point in the space where they live, the sorts of objects whose states
one species (in this) case by specifying the values of two numbers (one of
which is usually referred to as an amplitude, and the other as a phase) at
every point [. . . ].11
The values of the amplitude and the phase are thought of (aswith all elds)
as intrinsic properties of the points in the conguration space with which
they are associated.12
If a Humean does decide to take this path, then they must regard the wavefunction
as privileged over other representations of the quantum state—indeed, as privileged
over the quantum state itself. The quantum state can be represented as a function φ(p)
of momentum-space, for example, but the advocate of interpreting the wavefunction
as a eld will not (I presume) want to interpret the momentum function as a eld:
for that would mean committing to the physical existence of a “space of momenta”,
of which φ(p) predicates intrinsic properties. So on this view, there is an asymme-
try in how perspicuously the position and momentum wavefunctions represent the
metaphysical situation.
However, this doesn’t seem like an especial cost to the Humean that we are envis-
aging: since she is also (we have supposed) a Bohmian, the privileging of position
seems perfectly natural. On a technical level, the position representation of the quan-
tum state plays a privileged role in the guidance equation; and on a conceptual level,
position-space is privileged over (say) momentum-space by virtue of being the space
11This sentence nishes with “in the universe’s so-called conguration space”. This is because Albert is
here describing the case for the whole universe, rather than a single particle; we will return to this
below.
12[Albert, 1996, p. 278]
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in which the primitive ontology lives. So once again, Bohmianism seems to be a natu-
ral partner for the quantum Humean. That said, it seems that this partnership would
work equally well for any primitive ontology: provided that a primitive ontology is
required to be “a description of matter in space and time”,13 then the commitment to
primitive ontology will already mean privileging the position wavefunction—and so
interpreting the wavefunction as a eld (property of spacetime points) will not repre-
sent a further commitment. However, natural as this commitment may be for primi-
tive ontologists, it bears emphasising that adopting it puts the philosopher of quantum
mechanics at odds with standard practice in physics, in which the more general and
exible formalism of kets is primary, and wavefunctions are a means of representing
kets. We’ll see some consequences of this below.
4 Entanglement
Now thatwe have a decent grip onwhat is going on for single quantumparticles, let us
turn our attention to the issues posed by multiple particles—when those particles are
allowed to interact, and thereby become entangled. So: suppose (to begin with) that we
have two quantum systems, labelled 1 and 2 respectively, andwewant to represent the
available states for the pair of systems together—given the available states for system
1, and the available states for system 2. Now, we know that the states for system 1
make a Hilbert space H1, and that the states for system 2 make a Hilbert space H2;
and we should expect that the states for the joint system form a Hilbert space as well,
which we can denote H12. It is well-known how H12 is related to H1 and H2: it’s the
tensor product,
H12 = H1 ⊗H2 (7)
Dening the tensor product U ⊗ V of a pair of vector spaces U and V is a little tricky,
but for our purposes all we need to know about U ⊗ V is the following: that it is
a vector space, equipped with operations of addition and scalar multiplication; that
every pair of vectors (u, v) ∈ U × V corresponds to some element of u ⊗ v ∈ U ⊗ V
(though not vice versa, and not uniquely); and that the vector-space operations on U
13[Allori et al., 2008, p. 370]
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and V separately interact with those of U ⊗ V according to
(u+ u′)⊗ (v + v′) = (u⊗ v) + (u′ ⊗ v) + (u⊗ v′) + (u′ ⊗ v′) (8a)
(αu)⊗ v = α(u⊗ v) = u⊗ (αv) (8b)
The fact that we can build a vector space which manifests these properties is non-
trivial, but not something we need worry about; so long as the reader is willing to
take it on faith that this can be done, we can proceed. Note that the rules (8) entail the
imperfect correspondence between U × V and U ⊗ V . The addition rule means that
(u⊗v)+(u′⊗v′) will not typically correspond to any individual pair in U×V ; and the
scalar multiplication rule means that u⊗ v corresponds to the same element of U ⊗ V
as (λu)⊗ ( 1
λ
v) (for any scalar λ).
The phenomenon of entanglement arises from precisely the fact that not every ele-
ment of a tensor product space corresponds to some element of the Cartesian product:
that is, there are elements ofH1⊗H2 which do not correspond to any pair (|ψ〉1 , |φ〉2) ∈
H1 ×H2. Consider, for example,
1√
2
(|ψ〉1 ⊗ |φ〉2 + |ψ′〉1 ⊗ |φ′〉2) (9)
where 〈ψ|ψ′〉1 = 0 = 〈φ|φ′〉2. The sum (9) cannot be factorised into a single product,
and so we cannot treat it as simply arising from some assignment of states to systems
1 and 2 individually.
That said, there are mathematical objects which we could characterise as (at least
partially) representing the states of systems 1 and 2. In particular, the density opera-
tors associated to systems 1 and 2 remain well-dened even under entanglement; the
density operator of either system suces to predict the (probabilities of) outcomes of
measurements on that system. However, that pair of density operators do not suce
to uniquely x the density operator for the joint system (i.e., there are distinct density
operators for the joint systemwhich give rise to the same pair of density operators for
the subsystems). As a result, the subsystem density operators do not contain enough
information to predict the outcomes of joint measurements, i.e., do not predict the
correlations between the outcomes of measurements on the rst system with the out-
comes of measurements on the second. Moreover, one cannot give a dynamics for
how the pair of density operators will evolve.
What does this entail for the representations of the quantum state? Let us suppose
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that both systems are particles; then, to nd a basis of H12, we can use the operator
Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ , just as we used Xˆ for the individual Hilbert spaces.14 What we nd is that
eigenvectors of Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ inH12 are all of the form
|δx11 〉 ⊗ |δx22 〉 (10)
where {|δxii 〉}xi∈X are the eigenvectors of Xˆ in Hi, for i = 1, 2. Hence, any element
|Ψ〉12 ofH12 may be represented in the form
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
(x1,x2)∈X×X
Ψ(x1, x2) |δx11 〉 ⊗ |δx22 〉 (11)
where the joint wavefunctionΨ(x1, x2) is amapX2 → C, whereX2 := X×X . As above,
a trajectory of joint states can be represented by a function Ψ(t, x1, x2) : T ×X2 → C.
In other words, the natural index set to use for the position basis of a pair of particles
is not X itself, but X2—what is often called the 2-particle conguration space.15 If |Ψ〉12
is a product |ψ〉1 ⊗ |φ〉2, then the joint wavefunction Ψ(x1, x2) = ψ(x1)φ(x2); if we are
dealing with an entangled state, however, then this will not be the case.
Of course, entanglement between pairs of systems is only the beginning—in gen-
eral, any number N of quantum particles could be entangled with one another. The
states of such an N -fold entangled system would be represented as elements of the
Hilbert space
H := H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HN (12)
where Hi is the Hilbert space of the ith particle; and most elements of this Hilbert
space correspond to no N -tuple of individual states in H1 × · · ·HN . And if an ele-
ment of this Hilbert space is represented in the position basis, it gets represented by
14The tensor product A ⊗ B of two linear operators Aˆ : H1 → H1 and Bˆ : H2 → H2 is the (unique)
linear operator which acts on any product ket |ψ〉1 ⊗ |φ〉2 as
A⊗B(|ψ〉1 ⊗ |φ〉2) = A |ψ〉1 ⊗B |φ〉2
15There is a bit of a tradition, in the literature on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, of hand-
wringing about whether the textbook account can make sense of conguration space (given that
there is nothing, in the formalism, for points in conguration space to be the congurations of ). I
nd this concern almost totally unpersuasive: for the textbook account, points of (2-particle) cong-
uration space are understood as corresponding to pairs of points in (normal) space; this conception
is entirely clear, and entirely available to the textbook account. Sure, the name conguration space
isn’t ideal—butwho cares? The fact that StarDestroyers can’t destroy stars hardlymakes the concept
unintelligible.
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a wavefunction Ψ : XN → C, where XN is the N -particle conguration space:
XN := X × · · ·X︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
(13)
It will be worthwhile making a few brief remarks about the Bohmian perspective on
entanglement. If we have a collective ofN particles, then in addition to theN -particle
joint wavefunction Ψ(x), we have the locations of all N Bohmian corpuscles: these
locations are represented by anN -tuple (Q1, . . . , QN) of points inX , or (equivalently)
by a single point Q in XN . The evolution of Q is given by the guidance equation
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
(∇iΨ
Ψ
(Q)
)
(14)
where mi is the mass of the ith particle, and ∇i denotes the position operator associ-
ated with the ith coordinate of XN .
In Bohmian mechanics, there is an another way of representing the state of a sub-
system: the conditional wavefunction. If we select (say) the rstM < N particles as a
subsystem, then the conditional wavefunction of that subsystem (relative to the remain-
ing N −M particles) is given by
Ψ1...M(x1, . . . , xM) := Ψ(x1, . . . , xM , QM+1, . . . , QN) (15)
That is, the conditional wavefunction of the subsystem is obtained by “saturating” the
joint wavefunction with the actual locations of the remaining particles.
The importance of the conditional wavefunction is as follows: from the N -particle
guidance equation (14), one can immediately see that the Bohmian conguration of
the subsystem
Q1...M := (Q1, . . . , QM) (16)
obeys (14) with respect to the conditional wavefunction—for the simple reason that
Ψ(Q) = Ψ1...M(Q1...M). If the subsystem is suciently decoupled from its environ-
ment, then the conditional wavefunction will also abide by Schrödinger’s equation;
if there is interaction, however, then the conditional wavefunction will not evolve in
this unitary fashion. It is in this sense that the Bohmian picture incorporates “eective
collapse”: although the wavefunction Ψ of the entire system (in the limiting case, the
entire universe) evolves unitarily, the conditional wavefunctions associated to sub-
systems will not (and will, indeed, collapse in the manner prescribed by quantum
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measurement theory).
It is, however, important to note that although the conditional wavefunctions of
the subsystems can be recovered from the “universal wavefunction” Ψ, the reverse is
not true: the conditional wavefunctions associated to subsystems underdetermine the
jointwavefunction. For example, in the two-particle case, one can easily have a distinct
pair of joint wavefunctions Ψ(x1, x2) and Φ(x1, x2) such that Ψ(x1, Q2) = Φ(x1, Q2) and
Ψ(Q1, x2) = Φ(Q1, x2): that agreement only requires that they coincide on certain sur-
faces within conguration space. Moreover, in the case where the subsystem and the
environment are coupled to one another, it is not just that the conditional wavefunc-
tion does not evolve according to the Schrödinger dynamics—in general, there will
not be any autonomous dynamics for the conditional wavefunction at all. (Note the
parallels with the density operators.)
Let us now briey rehearse how this phenomenon makes trouble for our quantum
Humean, who wishes to give a metaphysical account of N quantum particles. First,
suppose that they have followed the rst strategy for making Humean sense of the
quantum mechanics of a single particle: that of interpreting the quantum state as ex-
pressing properties of the corpuscle. The basic problem is then that as the above has
indicated, there is (in general) no way of assigning states to each of the N particles
separately and individually, in such a way that their collective joint state can be re-
covered. So it seems that the only way to interpret the joint state is as expressing a
property that belongs, essentially and irreducibly, to the collection of corpuscles. But
a collection of point-like things is not itself point-like—so, contra Separability, not all
properties are localised to points. Alternatively, suppose that they have interpreted
the wavefunction as a eld. Then the problem is that (in general) there is no way of
reducing the joint wavefunction (a function of XN ) to a pair of single-particle wave-
functions (functions onX). (It is in this sense that the wavefunction of a multi-particle
system “lives on conguration space”.) So, at any time, the wavefunction can only be
thought of as expressing a property of N -tuples of spatial points.16 But an N -tuple of
spatial points is not itself a spatial point. So again, Separability is violated.
5 Modifying Humean supervenience
I now turn to how the Humean could seek to respond to the above argument. We
have seen that the problem arises if Humean supervenience (as stated by Lewis) is
16cf [Belot, 2011].
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combined with an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the quantum state
represents a component of the supervenience basis. In this section, I look at responses
which deviate from the exact Lewisian template for articulating the thesis of Humean
supervenience; in the next, I consider those which seek instead to expunge the quan-
tum state from the supervenience basis.
The rst response to discuss is arguably the best-known: that of taking the space
with respect to which separability is measured to be 3N -dimensional conguration
space, rather than 3-dimensional conguration space. Here is one inuential state-
ment of that position, due to Barry Loewer (although the position is also strongly
associated with David Albert):
More recently, Lewis has accepted that HS needs to be reformulated to ac-
commodate quantum nonlocality. Here is a suggestion for how to do so
in the context of Bohm’s theory. The quantum state of an n-particle sys-
tem is a eld in 3n dimension [sic] conguration space where the value
of the eld at a point in conguration space is the amplitude of the quan-
tum state at that point. These eld values can be thought of as intrinsic
properties of points. The ontology of Bohm’s theory also includes a “world
particle”whose location andmotion in conguration space determines the
locations and motions of ordinary material particles in three-dimensional
space, and the locations andmotions of these particles determine theman-
ifest world.17
This proposal is cast in terms of taking the wavefunction as a eld, but it is clear
enough how to modify Loewer’s proposal for one who wishes to take the quantum
state to be a property: we take as our ontology a single corpuscle (“world particle”)
moving in a 3N -dimensional space, and interpret the quantum state (element ofH :=
H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HN ) as representing a property of this corpuscle. By doing so, we get the
desired result, that all the properties knocking about are properties of pointlike enti-
ties.
Before critiquing this proposal, I want to argue that this idea—at least in the form
just canvassed—is functionally very similar to a seemingly quite dierent proposal:
Darby’s suggestion that we should expand the Humean supervenience basis, by al-
lowing in some non-spatiotemporal relations.18 Darby has his own proposal for how
17[Loewer, 1996, p. 104]
18[Darby, 2012]
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to do this so as to see o the threat to separability; here is an alternative.19 First, observe
that a relation’s holding amongst certain individuals is, for all intents and purposes,
the same as a property holding of the ordered sequence of those individuals; or, more
carefully, some bit of theoretical gubbins can be interpreted as representing a relation’s
holding amongst some individuals if and only if it may be interpreted as representing
a property holding of the ordered sequence of those individuals. But the elements of
H may be interpreted as properties of an ordered sequence of N corpuscles; hence,
they may equally well be interpreted as N -ary relations holding amongst those cor-
puscles. The additional relations that need to be added to the supervenience base,
then, are simply those which are not reducible to properties of the individual corpus-
cles. These are simply those relations represented by elements ofHwhich correspond
to no element ofH1 × · · · × HN .
Having said this much, we can see why the Darby and (modied) Loewer/Albert
proposals amount to a very similar move. Both recognise that the Humean base, at
least as classically understood, is inadequate as a supervenience base for quantum
states. Both propose a way to alter or enrich that base so as to make it adequate; and
both do so by allowing that the base be represented by the assignment of an element
of H to the collective of N corpuscles. The only dierence is in how they interpret
this assignment: as representing the possession of a property by the world-corpuscle,
which is (in some sense) in correspondence with the collective on N corpuscles; or as
representing the possession of a relation by theN corpuscles collectively. Note that we
could also modify Darby’s proposal to make it akin to the unmodied Loewer/Albert
proposal, by taking the wavefunction as privileged: it would then be glossed as repre-
senting a (determinable) relation that holds ofN -tuples of points of space collectively,
rather than as representing a (determinable) property of points of conguration space.
But again, the dierences between these glosseswould not beworth losingmuch sleep
over.
Thus, we have a set of closely related proposals—the primary dierence among
them being that canvassed in section 3, between views which interpret the quantum
state as a property of a quantum system, and views which interpret the wavefunction
as a eld. All of them propose that we relax our commitment to Separability, by let-
19The proposal given here is somewhat simpler than Darby’s, as a result of the fact that I have been at-
footedly taking quantum states to correspond to properties. Darby has to engage in some slightly
more careful manoeuvring, since he takes the relationship between quantum states and properties
to be more delicate: properties, for Darby, are taken to correspond to eigenvectors of projectors on
Hilbert space, rather than arbitrary elements of the space.
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ting the supervenience basis contain metaphysical structure that cannot be localised
to individual spacetime points.20 But all of these proposals then face the question of
whether this modication moves too far away from the purposes that Humean super-
venience is supposed to serve.
To see why they might be thought to do so, note that both of these strategies are
troublingly easy to generalise. Prima facie, the kind of world that violates Separability
is one in which there are necessary connections between distinct existents: that is, in
which there are fundamental and irreducible relations between pointlike things (irre-
ducible in the sense that they do not supervene on any properties of the parts). But any
such relations—of whatever arity—can be redescribed as properties of congurations
of the pointlike entities, and thence as properties of entities which are pointlike with
respect to the conguration space for those entities. Similarly, but more directly, if we
are permitted to add relations into the supervenience basis, then clearly an irreducibly
relational world of this kind can be made consistent with Humean supervenience. So
what kind of metaphysics is still being ruled out by such liberalised versions of the
doctrine?
The natural response is that Humeanism still has a nontrivial content, since it main-
tains that the modal facts of the world supervene upon the non-modal facts—even if
we allow those non-modal facts to be relational in character, rather than pointwise
intrinsic. I take this to be guiding thought behind Darby’s discussion of a “spirit” of
Humean supervenience:
So, the letter of Lewis’s Humean supervenience can be violated along var-
ious dimensions, and to varying degrees. It also seems, though this is
less obvious, that some dimensions are more signicant than others. [. . . ]
This line of thought is what suggests a spirit of Humean supervenience.
Corresponding to the ‘broadly Humean doctrine’ of [Lewis, 1980]—which
‘holds that all the facts there are about the world are particular facts, or
combinations thereof’ (and so diers from [Lewis, 1986, pp. ix-x] in saying
nothing further about the nature of the particular facts)—this would allow
variation along some dimensions (for example, dierences in the nature of
20A complication: the Loewer/Albert kind of proposal is often presented as one in which we maintain
Separability—glossed as the claim that metaphysical structure can be localised to individual points
of the “fundamental physical space”—but change our mind about what the fundamental physical
space is (by taking that to be conguration space rather than ordinary space). I think it is easier to
keep track of what is going on if we take Separability as the requirement of localisability to ordinary
space, so that the meaning of the doctrine remains constant.
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spacetime and the external relations that unify it), butwould be violated by
moving in others (the addition of unHumean chancemakers or lawmaking
relations between universals).21
This seems quite correct. At this point, however, we have rather lost track of the di-
alectic. After all, the discussions of whetherHumean supervenience is consistent with
quantummechanics were only ever about the locality requirements bound up in Lewis’
assertions regarding “the nature of the particular facts”, i.e., the doctrine of Separa-
bilty. Indeed, as remarked earlier, the possibility of factorising Humeanism into two
components is present in Maudlin’s discussion:
Although he does not remark it, Lewis’s Humeanism comprises two log-
ically independent doctrines. The rst, which we may call Separability,
claims that all fundamental properties are local properties and that spatio-
temporal relations are the only fundamental external physical relations. To
be precise:
Doctrine 1 (Separability): The complete physical state of theworld
is determined by (supervenes on) the intrinsic physical state of
each spacetime point (or each pointlike object) and the spatio-
temporal relations between those points.
[. . . ] The doctrine of Separability concerns only how the total physical state
of the universe depends on the physical state of localized bits of the uni-
verse. The second component of Lewis’s Humeanism takes care of every-
thing else:
Doctrine 2 (Physical Statism): All facts about a world, including
modal and nomological facts, are determined by its total physical
state.22
Thus, insofar as we were worried about a tension between Humeanism and quantum
mechanics, that tension only ever pertained to Separability,23 not to Physical Statism.
So to “respond” to this tension by relinquishing Separability is simply to concede the
ground that was being challenged.
21[Darby, 2012, p. 783]
22[Maudlin, 2007b, p. 51]
23That is, Separability with respect to ordinary space (see footnote 20).
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6 Best-system quantum states
So, are there more substantial responses available—responses which do not just re-
linquish Separability? There are indeed: in particular, let us consider the responses
oered by [Miller, 2014] and [Bhogal and Perry, 2015]. To reiterate, the problem is that
Separability is in tension with the non-localised nature of the quantum state. So if we
want it to be the case that everything in the Humean supervenience basis abides by
Separability, we will have to reject the claim that the quantum state is part of that
supervenience basis. Note that this strategy is only available if some form of primi-
tive ontology is knocking around, in order that there are some fundamental physical
facts available other than the facts about the quantum state. So the proposal is to take
these other facts—in this particular case, the facts about the Bohmian trajectories—to
comprise the Humean supervenience basis.
The natural next question, then, is what the status of the quantum state is on this
picture. The answer that both Miller and Bhogal & Perry provide is that the quantum
state—like everything else—supervenes upon the supervenience basis, i.e., upon the
motions of the Bohmian corpuscles. We need to be careful, however, about the ex-
act sense in which this supervenience takes place. One might have thought that the
supervenience thesis had the following form: given the trajectories of the Bohmian
corpuscles, there is a unique wavefunction which could have brought about those
trajectories in a dynamically acceptable way. That is, let Ψ : T × XN → C be an
N -particle wavefunction, and QN : T → XN be a trajectory through N -particle con-
guration space, such that Ψ and Q between them solve the Schrödinger equation
(for some specic Hamiltonian H) and the Bohmian guidance equation. Then (the
claim goes) there is no distinct wavefunction Ψ′ : T × XN → C such that Ψ′ and Q
jointly solve the Schrödinger equation (with the same Hamiltonian) and the Bohmian
guidance equation.
This kind of supervenience is not to be had, at least in general: there are distinct
solutions of the Schrödinger equation which generate the same motions for Bohmian
particles.24 Consider a Bohmian particle in a box: that is, a particle with one positional
degree of freedom, which is conned to the unit interval [0, 1] (but is otherwise free).
Then the energy eigenfunctions of the system are of the form
φn(x) = sin(npix) (17)
24The below is taken from [Belot, 2011].
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for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . . As an eigenfunction, φn evolves under the Schrödinger equation
only into stateswhich are equivalent to φn (up to phase). But by the guidance equation,
dQ/dt = 0 if the wavefunction is φn, or if it is any wavefunction equivalent to φn . So
any pair of such eigenfunctions are associated to the same Bohmian trajectory: namely,
that of the particle remaining at rest. The best that can be hoped for is that cases such
as this are exceptional; this is plausible, but it is not clear how to go about proving it.
However, for our purposes here the question is moot. For even if a positive answer
to this technical question could be found, it is not one which would be desperately
useful to the Humean: for what it would show is that in non-exceptional cases, the
Bohmian trajectories together with the laws of Bohmian mechanics uniquely determine
the wavefunction. And of course, the Humean denies that the laws are to be taken
as part of the supervenience basis. However, this also suggests a natural thing the
Humean might seek to say instead: that the Bohmian trajectories determine both the
quantum dynamics and the wavefunction. This means that the Humean can nesse
the technical question above, by arguing that the wavefunction is determined by the
same “best-system” method used to generate the laws. That is, the claim need not
be that the Bohmian trajectories uniquely x the quantum dynamics and the specic
wavefunction involved in those dynamics: or at least, not in the sense of there being
just one dynamics-plus-wavefunction package which would deliver those trajectories.
Instead, the idea is that of the candidate packages, precisely one will maximise sim-
plicity and strength (under some appropriate weighting); and this package is the one
which the Humean takes to be the correct characterisation of what’s going on.
This strategy is that advocated by both [Miller, 2014] and [Bhogal and Perry, 2015].
One small clarication, before we proceed. It is clearly intended that the Bohmian
trajectories are part of the supervenience basis; but do those trajectories exhaust the
supervenience basis? Or is the distribution over particles of properties such as mass,
or charge, or (total) spin25 also a part of the basis? On the one hand, both [Miller, 2014]
and [Bhogal and Perry, 2015] sympathetically discuss [Hall, 2009]’s proposal that the
Humean should introduce mass and charge as part of the best systematisation, rather
than treating them as a component of the supervenience basis. On the other, the more
austere the supervenience basis is, the less plausible it is that the full quantumdynam-
ics really will supervene upon it (of which more below). So in the interests of charity,
let us suppose that mass, charge etc. are indeed included in the basis.26
25That is, the spin quantum number of the particles (not the projection of the spin along some axis).
26That said, as mentioned above, the imputation of appropriately localised mass, charge etc. to
Bohmian particles is not entirely straightforward: again, see [Brown et al., 1996].
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So, the picture is as follows. We take as given a collection of Bohmian particles, each
bearing a certain mass, charge and spin, and each with a certain trajectory through
space over time. In order to specify the best system, we need to then introduce a
new piece of theoretical vocabulary: that of the quantum state. [Miller, 2014] and
[Bhogal and Perry, 2015] both use the wavefunction Ψ as the appropriate representa-
tive for this state. For the reasons discussed already, the Humean could equally well
use a ket |Ψ〉 in a Hilbert space equipped with a position operator; to facilitate the di-
alectic, however, I will also suppose that we are using the wavefunction. The Humean
should then claim that the best system for codifying those trajectories is one which
asserts the following:27
• That Ψ is a complex-valued eld on T ×XN
• That Ψ(0,x) has such-and-such a value at x, for each x ∈ XN
• That Ψ satises the Schrödinger equation
• That the location of each corpuscle, together withΨ, satises the Bohmian guid-
ance equation
Miller does not dwell for long on the fact that we are utilising a best system whose
vocabulary is not conned to terms referring to individuals and properties in the su-
pervenience basis,28 remarking only that “what makes it the case that there is a pilot
wave is that the best systemdescription of the physical world speaks in terms of it, and
this description speaks in terms of it because it is part of an ecient and eective sum-
mary of what is fundamental: the positions of particles in space over time.”29 Bhogal
and Perry, on the other hand, recognise this liberalisation as a signicant departure
from more standard presentations of Humeanism:30
27[Bhogal and Perry, 2015] use a best system which postulates a space Q (with the structure of XN )
and a particle ω moving around within Q (whose location at any time is exactly correlated with
the conguration of the N particles); the wavefunction is then postulated as a function assigning a
complex number to each point of Q, which then acts on ω via the guidance equation. If Q here is
intended to simply be dened asXN (i.e., as the space consisting ofN -tuples of points ofX), then I
take these systems to be essentially the same. If not—that is, if the idea is to stipulate Q’s structure
separately and then put it into appropriate correspondence with N -tuples of points of X—then it
seems to me that the system outlined here will be considerably simpler, at no cost in strength.
28If the wavefunction Ψ did refer to anything in the basis, then we would be back to something like
the Albert/Loewer/Darby strategy rejected above.
29[Miller, 2014, p. 580]
30Albeit one which—as they observe—is pregured by Hall’s discussion of mass and charge, and
Lewis’ discussion of chance.
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The way we do this is by expanding the language that candidate systems
can be formulated in. As before [i.e., in standardHumeanism], systems can
use vocabulary that refers to perfectly natural properties (the properties
that make up the mosaic)—what we’ve called the “base language.” But in
addition to this they can introduce and use any other vocabulary so long
as it comes in uninterpreted.31
So, we now have a concrete proposal on the table: both the Bohmian dynamics and
the wavefunction are to be recovered as components of a best systematisation of some
(presumably highly structured) collection of Bohmian trajectories. The question that
we should now ask is whywe ought to believe that they can be so recovered. Themost
explicit way to show this would be to rst determine some scalar eld over the space
of all sets of dierential equations (whichmeasures the “simplicity” and “strength” of
each set of equations); x on a particular solution Σ to the guidance equation, relative
to an arbitrary wavefunction, and consider all those sets of dierential equations of
which Σ is a solution; and then see whether the guidance equation and Schrödinger
equation jointly occupy a maximum of that eld, relative to some wavefunction (not
necessarily the one with which we began—the Humean is committed only to recov-
ering the guidance equation, not the specic form of the wavefunction). The game
would then be to nd a solution which does indeed have this property, and which
(together with its associated wavefunction) is a plausible candidate to represent the
actual evolution of the world.
This is an insanely dicult problem. First, we need to overcome the formidable hur-
dles of nding an appropriate scalar eld over sets of dierential equations. Second,
even given such ameasure, it would be extraordinary if the project of nding some so-
lution for which the Bohmian equations are indeed the best system proved to be even
remotely mathematically tractable. Third, it is rather opaque what would be involved
in showing that that a given wavefunction and Bohmian distribution is “a plausible
candidate to represent the actual evolution of the world”; but given that at least a nec-
essary condition would be that the distribution contain an unbelievably large number
of particles, the prospects for doing so do not look good.32
Now, the quantum Humean might respond that these problems are barriers to any
form of Humeanism about laws of nature. We might wonder why this response, even
31[Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 5]
32This is even supposing that we spot the Humean the ction that non-relativistic quantummechanics
is empirically adequate for representing the actual evolution of the world.
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if itwere granted, should carry anydialectic force: amathematically hopeless program
is not rescued by being only one aspect of a larger mathematically hopeless program.
But as amatter of fact, there are barriers to quantumHumeanismover and above those
faced by general Humeanism, brought about by the very liberalisation of the Humean
project that was thought to be key: the possibility of introducing new theoretical vo-
cabulary when constructing the best system. This means that the available systems of
equations to consider are not limited to just those equations employing only a xed
stock of variables and parameters (i.e., those ranging over the supervenience basis);
rather, we must consider any equations whose variables and parameters include that
xed stock. So the hopelessness has, at a minimum, substantially increased in magni-
tude.
Moreover, there are features specic to the quantum casewhich undermine a classic
Humean response to the above concern: namely, that we need not solve this problem,
because the actual practice of science provides us with sucient evidence that the
actual theory preferred by scientists is the best system. Bhogal and Perry suggest such
a response:
This worry, that mere positional facts wouldn’t be complicated enough
to distinguish something like Bohmian Mechanics as the best system of
that world, strikes us as far too pessimistic. One of the key motivating
thoughts behind the best system account is that whatever an ideal scien-
tist, if she was fully rational and knew everything about the state of the
mosaic, would take to be the best overall theory given the evidence is the
best system of that world.
Actual scientists are not ideal reasoners and they do not have access to the
entirety of the facts about themosaic. Of the elements of themosaic, actual
scientists only have direct access to facts about positions. [. . . ]
If we look to actual scientic practice, we see that physicists, even with ac-
cess to only a tiny slice of the position facts, have a great deal of condence
that theworld is quantummechanical (and consider this position verywell
conrmed). If this, in the grand scheme of things, meager set of position
facts is enough to satisfy non-ideal working scientists, then we see very
little reason to be skeptical that the ideal scientist, with access to all the po-
sition facts at our Bohmian world, would settle on a Bohmian Mechanical
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physical theory.33
In other words: non-ideal actual scientists, with access to only a small portion of
the facts in the Humean supervenience basis, have in fact come up with Bohmian
mechanics as the best systematisation of their data; this provides at least some reason
to think that an ideal scientist, who had access to all the facts in the supervenience
basis, would come up with Bohmian mechanics as the best systematisation of the full
set of facts. However, the application of this idea here is highly dubious.
First, note that the above argument elides the distinction between quantum me-
chanics and Bohmian mechanics: just as a matter of sociological fact, it is false that
the theory at which actual scientists have arrived as their best theory is Bohmian me-
chanics. Nor is this explicable as mere interpretational preference: much of the best
experimental evidence for quantummechanics falls outwith the purview of Bohmian
analyses! For one thing, it remains the case that no Bohmian version of quantum eld
theory has been developed, which cuts o support from the predictive success of high
energy physics. More generally, the analysis of radiation in Bohmian mechanics is not
straightforward: so even the two-slit experiment, conducted with light, is not readily
explicable within Bohmianmechanics. Finally, evenwith regards to quantum systems
that are in principle analysable in Bohmian terms, there are plenty of examples where
doing so is highly unnatural. The standard means of analysing a quantum system
means characterising its dynamics in terms of whatever degrees of freedom are most
apt for the problem at hand; but calculating what the corpuscles are up to requires
always working in the position basis. So even if a Bohmian analysis is in principle
available, it may well fall beyond any practical capacity of working physicists.
In other words, the antecedent of the argument above—that scientists have come
up with Bohmian mechanics as the best systematisation of their data—is not true;
what they have come up with is quantum mechanics. Moreover, given that Bohmian
mechanics is signicantly more limited in its explanatory scope than quantum me-
chanics, it seems that the best explanation of this sociological fact is that Bohmian
mechanics is not the best systematisation of the data to hand; or at least, that it is not
regarded as such by the scientic community. Of course, this isn’t to rule out the pos-
sibility that some extension of Bohmian mechanics could close that explanatory gap,
and thereby come to be accepted by the scientic community as the best system. The
point is just that this remains a possibility, not actuality: so the Bohmian Humean can-
not appeal to actual scientic practice as evidence that their proposed best system is
33[Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 18]
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indeed best.
Second, suppose that we do conne our attention to just the kinds of situations that
Bohmian mechanics is able to give an account of (e.g. the two-slit experiment with
electrons). The claim at hand is that Bohmian mechanics ought to be regarded as the
best systematisation of the experimental data for such situations. In support of that
claim, one could observe that the Born rule can be derived from Bohmian mechanics
(together with the quantum equilibrium hypothesis);34 this at least makes it plausi-
ble that the probability distributions for such experiments are best systematised by
Bohmian mechanics. However, this argument also highlights a diculty with infer-
ring, from this claim, that Bohmian mechanics is the best systematisation of the actual
Bohmian trajectories. For the experimental data in question consists, as just mentioned,
of probability distributions over such trajectories, rather than (an incomplete set of)
the trajectories themselves: we never gain direct access to exactly what trajectories are
being followed. So even the argument for these cases contains a further assumption,
that the most compact description of the actual trajectories is as a probability distri-
bution. The Humean shouldn’t be alarmed by the general idea that this might be the
case.35 The problem, rather, is that they can’t point to anything concrete to explainwhy
we ought to think that it is the case: in particular, given the empirical inaccessibility
of the actual trajectories, scientic practice cannot be invoked to justify the claim that
probability distributions best systematise the trajectories (even granting, aswe are, the
claim that Bohmian mechanics best systematises the probability distributions).
Note that the reason these problems arise is that the quantum Humean is, in one
crucial respect, worse o than her classical cousin: the latter could, at least, identify
the kind of structure in the supervenience basis (i.e., intrinsic properties of points
or pointlike things) with the experimental data that (idealised) science collects, and
hence argue that the vast parallel-processor of the scientic enterprise has in fact sys-
tematised that data into an optimally simple and strong codication. By doing so, the
classical Humean can relieve some of the pressure to make precise the nature of the
best systematisation they envisage, or to show that such a thing is even possible, since
science itself could be taken as demonstrating a proof of principle. The experimental
basis for quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is a poor t with the supervenience
basis of the Bohmian Humean. On the one hand, it is too big: it covers many more
situations than those to which Bohmianism is readily applied. On the other, it is too
34[Dürr et al., 1992]; see [Maudlin, 2007a] or [Callender, 2007] for analysis of the notion of “typicality”
used in that derivation. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
35Indeed, this is just the standard Humean account of objective chances (see [Lewis, 1994]).
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small: the proposed supervenience basis (even over some local region) goes far be-
yond what could be gathered by empirical investigation (even in principle). Without
this tight t between the supervenience basis and the empirical basis, I don’t see how
empirical practice can be a source of optimism that Bohmianmechanics is, indeed, the
best systematisation of the supervenience basis.
Before wrapping up, I do want to note a somewhat dierent route that the Miller-
Bhogal-Perry Humean could try to take. Throughout this section, I’ve been working
on the assumption that the Humean wants to expunge the entirety of the quantum
state from their supervenience basis (since that’s the proposal most widely defended
in the literature). However, it’s not clear to me that the Humean need be quite so puri-
tanical. What if the Humean admitted a supervenience basis of Bohmian corpuscles,
plus some appropriately local “bits” of the quantum state: for example, one-particle
density operators or conditional wavefunctions? These seem like Humeanistically ac-
ceptable objects: the density operators could be interpreted as representing proper-
ties of the corresponding corpuscles, whilst the wavefunctions could be interpreted
as representing elds (on good old regular 3-space). As discussed in the section on
entanglement, these objects do not uniquely determine the full joint state, nor are they
(in general) subject to an autonomous dynamics; but the same goes for the Bohmian
trajectories. It’s also worth noting that the density operator proposal, at least, doesn’t
presume Bohmian mechanics or even any primitive ontology at all. So it could oer
a way of being Humean to those who aren’t signed-up members of the primitive-
ontology program.
Furthermore, by employing a richer supervenience basis, this kind ofHumeanmakes
it more plausible that full quantum mechanics will turn out to be the best systemati-
sation of the behaviour of that basis: rather than the full quantum state together with
the laws, they just need to recover the correlative aspects of the quantum state (i.e. the
degrees of freedom in the quantum state not xed by the individual density operators
or conditional wavefunctions), together with the laws. Moreover, by having objects in
their supervenience basis which more closely resemble quantum states, the worries I
raised above might be ameliorated: it’s less clear that one need be tied to working in
the position basis, and there is a more obvious link between the supervenience basis
and the empirical basis. So there seems more scope to say that the practice of science
gives us reason to think that quantum theory is the best systematisation of the super-
venience basis. I’m still somewhat pessimistic about the prospects of making this all
work out, and—as discussed in the next section—I’m not sure that the motivation for
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doing so really stands up. But it does seem to me that this proposal (which to my
knowledge, has not received much discussion in the literature) is the best way for the
Humean to go.
7 Conclusion
Overall, then, I conclude that tting quantum entanglement into the frame ofHumean
supervenience remains an unnished business. It seems appropriate, therefore, to
briey pause and try to take stock of what the benet of successfully performing this
Procrustean feat might be. What would be the gains of having a separable—or more
generally, a Humean—picture of the world to hand? Classically, a signicant com-
ponent of the motivation has been taken to be epistemic: since what we have direct
epistemic access to (the thought goes) are facts about intrinsic properties of individ-
ual spacetimepoints or pointlike entities, we should seek ametaphysics foundedupon
those facts.
Now, one can certainly criticise this move, from a premise about what is epistemi-
cally available to a conclusion about what is metaphysically acceptable.36 However, it
is also worth observing that even the antecedent of this argument seems to be false.
We’ve already seen how our evidence for quantum mechanics is not easily identied
with the components of a plausible, separable supervenience basis for quantum me-
chanics. More generally, though, there is something extremely puzzling about the
idea that separability is a precondition for direct epistemic access: for we can perform
entanglement experiments, in which we (at least on the account given by quantum
mechanics) do indeed observe non-separable phenomena! So what is going on?
The answer, I contend, is that although individual observations are indeed (some-
what) localised, it just does not follow that those observations cannot provide infor-
mation about or evidence for irreducibly global goings-on. Prima facie, at least, the
way in which one does so is about the simplest imaginable: we simply make multiple
local observations, and then aggregate those observations. So suppose, for example,
that mass was not locally conserved, but was conserved on some larger scale—let’s
say, on the scale of the Earth. It is straightforwardly possible to accumulate evidence
for this hypothesis, by making continuous observations at dierent points of space,
and then comparing the results. Of course, it is harder to do so than it would be for a
purely local phenomenon; and if the scale of the mass conservation were larger still,
36See [Maudlin, 2007b] for a particularly biting critique.
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then it might well move beyond our capacities to verify it. But the simplistic picture
of scientic evidence that seems to motivate the doctrine of separability is long due
retirement; and with it, the insistence that our best scientic theories be made to t
that doctrine, at whatever price.
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